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Abstract
We analyze tax competition between large and asymmetric countries and
derive conditions under which countries assist foreign authorities in collecting
tax revenues via information exchange. It turns out that voluntary exchange
of information is a Nash equilibrium between asymmetric countries, resulting
in an eﬃcient use of taxes by governments. However, this equilibrium is
not unique and the structure of the resulting equilibrium–selection problem
depends on the relative size of countries. Our model gives an explanation
for the empirical observation that especially smaller countries are reluctant to
co–ordinate on the full–information equilibrium, whereas countries of similar
size can solve the information problem.
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Globalization and the removal of barriers to the free movement of capital have
promoted economic development, yet at the same time they have increased the
scope for tax avoidance and tax evasion. The fears that taxes on mobile capital are
not sustainable are particularly strong in the European Union, where many of the
obstacles to capital market integration have been eliminated as part of the internal
market program and transaction costs of foreign investment are further reduced
in the monetary union. Inspired by the example of the United States where a
system of information exchange between states is in place, the European Commission
recently proposed a council directive intended to establish a comprehensive system
of information exchange on interest payments paid to individuals in Europe. The
purpose is to make residence–based taxation of savings income sustainable.
The objective of this paper is to explore whether such agreements are politically
feasible in an economic union in the sense that voluntary exchange of information
(i) is a Nash equilibrium and (ii) leads to a Pareto improvement in each coun-
try compared to a situation without information exchange. Whenever a country is
large, a shortfall of domestic savings drives up the world interest rate and ‘crowds
out’ domestic investment, even under the assumption used in most work on interna-
tional tax competition that portfolio investment is made through a ﬁnancial market
on which a single rate of return can be obtained.1 Conﬂicts of interests may then
arise because each country will be tempted to set its policy so as to take advan-
tage of market power, at least so long as it can ignore any threat of retaliation by
other countries. Several authors have focused on country size as one determinant
of diverging interests (Bucovetsky 1991, Wilson 1991, Kanbur and Keen 1993). A
central result, obtained for both capital and commodity taxation, is that the smaller
1The present paper also assumes perfect capital–market integration, which seems to be reason-
able in Europe after the establishment of the monetary union. The tests by Bayoumi and Rose
(1993) (for the United Kingdom), Sinn (1992) (for the United States on 1950s data) and Helliwell
and McKitrick (1999) (for the Canadian provinces) show that savings and investment are uncor-
related within jurisdictions, suggesting that exchange rate variability may be the cause for the
high savings–investment correlations across countries found by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) in the
post–1973 period. Feldstein (1994) concludes ‘A monetary union would cause member countries
to lose their ability to use ﬁnancial policies to aﬀect domestic investment rates [...]’.
1of two countries has the higher per capita utility in the Nash equilibrium because it
perceives a higher tax base elasticity and undercuts its larger trading partner.
We introduce diﬀerences in country size in an adapted version of Bucovetsky and
Wilson’s (1991) model, where savings and labor supply decisions are endogenous.
The level of information exchange as well as tax rates are strategic variables in the
model; and governments use a source tax on the capital invested, wage taxation
and a residence-based tax on savings to pay for the costs of national public goods.2
Since we allow countries to posses market power, the home supply of capital and
labor should react to changes in the home country’s information policy – foreign
investors tend to increase savings when the information policy of the home govern-
ment is relaxed. The above observations seem to suggest that it is proﬁtable for each
country to reduce the level of information exchange unilaterally, since the tendency
of the world interest rate to decrease will increase both output and the income of
the immobile factor labor in the home country. Thus, the standard ‘race to the
bottom’ intuition would suggest that the result is to restrict information exchange
and to strategically reduce tax rates on capital income. However, there has been
no formal analysis of this issue in the previous literature. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, we show that governments will adjust taxes as to exactly oﬀset the general
equilibrium eﬀects of a variation in information exchange, even when countries diﬀer
in size. There exists a Nash equilibrium where governments have no incentive to use
information strategically.
Moreover, the model also yields the conclusion of Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson
(1991) that there exists a Nash equilibrium where countries choose not to provide
information. Then, the larger of two countries always has a comparative disadvan-
tage and the globally eﬃcient allocation is not an equilibrium. In line with Binmore
(1998) and Cooter (2000) we will call a problem structure where the globally eﬃcient
solution is not an equilibrium a co–operation problem. A problem structure where
the globally eﬃcient solution is an equilibrium but this equilibrium is not unique
will be called co–ordination problem in the following. The distinction between co–
operation and co–ordination changes the perception of the problem. Co–ordination
2We abstain from analyzing taxes on savings other than on a residence basis. In a companion
paper, Eggert, Kolmar and Tulkens (2001) focus on the interaction between residence and source–
based taxes on income from savings. One core result is that governments are not able to collect
tax revenue from source-based taxation of savings with perfect capital mobility.
2problems diﬀer from co-operation problems with respect to their political conse-
quences. Technically, co-operation problems can only be solved by a change in the
institutional structure that makes the Pareto-optimum an equilibrium.3 The result-
ing mechanism-design problem implies the strengthening of a centralized authority.
Co-operation rules have to be promulgated and deviations from these rules have to
be suﬃciently and credibly punished by a central authority.
The need for institutional change is weaker for co-ordination problems because
the eﬃcient policies are an equilibrium, even in the absence of a supra-national au-
thority. Then, the equilibrium-selection problem can, for example, be solved by the
creation of a round table. We show that the structure of the equilibrium–selection
problem depends on the relative size of the countries. The results suggest that the
creation of a round table is suﬃcient when countries are rather homogeneous, but it
is not when countries are heterogeneous. The reason is that an inﬁnitely small coun-
try would lose from a co-ordination on the full-information equilibrium. However,
the equilibrium with full exchange of information will still dominate the equilibrium
where governments choose not to provide information according to the potential
Pareto criterion, implying that a large country can compensate a smaller country
by a voluntary transfer of resources.
Our results provide a possible explanation for two empirical puzzle why especially
small countries like Luxembourg or Switzerland are reluctant to the introduction of
an information-exchange system. The larger country does not voluntarily grant the
transfer payments which are necessary to make the potential Pareto improvement an
actual Pareto improvement once the new equilibrium is reached. Hence, whether it is
possible to solve the equilibrium-selection problem or not depends on the credibility
of the larger country’s transfer payments, which are only sustainable if a central
authority credibly enforces information exchange.
Our result that the smaller of two otherwise identical countries is more reluctant
to establish an exchange-of-information system is akin to the conjecture of Bacchetta
and Espinosa (1995, p. 117) in their conclusions and to the results in Bacchetta and
Espinosa (2000) and Huizinga and Nielsen (2001), except for the point that the
persistence of an equilibrium where countries choose to withhold information is ob-
tained in the presence of perfect capital mobility when the level of portfolio capital
3E.g. by implementing Pigouvian subsidies as in Wildasin (1988) or (implicit) transfer payments
through tax provisions as in Homburg (1999) and Keen and Wildasin (2000).
3invested domestically cannot explain private income or tax revenue. Huizinga and
Nielsen (2001) characterize information exchange equilibria (among many others)
when proﬁt income of domestic banks accrues to domestic residents. Bacchetta and
Espinosa (2000) focus on the trade-oﬀ between tax base eﬀects and tax-export ef-
fects. In contrast to both papers, we do not assume that the information-exchange
policy of a country has a direct eﬀect on the budget of residents or the public.
Instead, we obtain our results in a setting where ﬁscal policy is able to manipu-
late world prices. The results we obtain are, thus, complementary to the existing
arguments.
The plan of the paper is as follows. After the model description in Section 2, we
examine Nash equilibria with information exchange in Section 3. Tax competition
without information exchange is then investigated in Section 4. Section 5 gives our
concluding remarks.
2 The model
Our analysis employs the two–period model of asymmetric capital tax competition
from Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991), adapted to incorporate both country speciﬁc
asymmetries in the tradition of Bucovetsky (1991), Wilson (1991) and strategic use of
information exchange policies. Consider two countries, i,j, which are linked through
international capital mobility. Countries are identical in per–capita endowments,
technologies and preferences, but not in population size. Each of the two countries
has a ﬁxed number of internationally immobile consumers.
Let us denote world population by N = Ni + Nj. Then, ni = Ni/N gives the
relative population size of country i with ni = 1 − nj. Individuals in each country
supply labor and capital. The time structure of the model is as follows. At the
beginning of a ﬁrst period governments choose and credibly commit to future tax
rates non–cooperatively, and consumers receive an endowment. The endowment
can either be consumed or invested. In a second period, consumers make their labor
supply decision and ﬁrms produce using labor and capital as inputs.
Governments, institutions and the structure of information: Individuals
in country i can invest their savings in either the country of residence or abroad. The
4national authority (government in the following) in each country uses a residence–
based tax on capital income, tr
i, a source–based tax on domestic real investment, ts
i,
and a tax on wage income, tw
i , to meet a public budget constraint. Let us denote
by R,wi the world return on capital and the gross wage rate, respectively. It is
convenient to denote by ri the gross rate of return for a ﬁrm, by ρi the net of tax
rate of interest on individual savings and the net of tax wage rate in country i




i = ri − R source–based capital tax,
t
r
i = R − ρi residence–based capital tax,
t
w
i = wi − ωi wage tax. (1)
In order to enforce the diﬀerent tax instruments each government needs information
about wage incomes, savings, and capital investments. We assume that the legal
system is such that a government in country i can verify the capital stock invested,
the wage income earned, and the savings invested in country i, but not the savings
invested in country j. Hence, the wage tax as well as the source–based capital tax can
be perfectly enforced without the help of the foreign country, whereas the residence–
based tax on savings can only be enforced if the foreign country j truthfully reports
the amount of savings residents of country i invest in country j.4 If reporting is
incomplete, capital income is composed of taxed and untaxed income. In order
to provide a tractable framework which incorporates endogenous factor supply of
residents and the information problem we assume that governments strategically
decide about the fraction λi ∈ [0,1] of foreign savings they report.
Firms: Firms in both countries produce a homogeneous consumption good whose
price is normalized to unity. In order to have a clear notation, let us denote func-





exhibits constant returns to scale and relates per-capita output of the consumption
good to the per-capita level of (real) capital investment, ki, and per capita labor
4We neglect the costs of the collection of information about individuals’ savings decisions by tax
authorities. It is important to note, however, that once this information is collected the marginal
costs of information provision are almost equal to zero, as for most data bases. More importantly
there is no cost diﬀerential between the provision of information to a foreign or a domestic tax
authority.
5employed, ld
i.5 Using the tax deﬁnitions (1), the zero–proﬁt condition of a ﬁrm in






i −ri ki = 0, from which we obtain the following ﬁrst–order















where we denote derivatives by subscripts. Diﬀerentiating the zero–proﬁt condition
and using (2) gives the slope of the factor–price frontier for changes in the gross










Households: In the two-period model, consumers receive an endowment ei and
determine savings in the ﬁrst and labor supply in the second period to maximize
lifetime utility subject to their budget constraints. Denote by ci1,ci2 per–capita pri-
vate consumption in the ﬁrst and second period, by li labor supply, and by gi the
consumption level of a publicly provided (private) good of a consumer in country i.
The utility function u(ci1,ci2,li)+ ˜ u(gi) is assumed to be twice continuously diﬀer-
entiable and strictly quasi-concave. The ﬁrst-period budget constraint of a consumer
in country i can be written as




i i 6= j, (4)
where si
i gives the level of savings residents invest domestically and s
j
i denotes savings
that are invested abroad. In the second period consumers receive wage income and
the principal plus interest income. Using the tax deﬁnitions (1), the second-period
budget constraint is








+ [1 + R][1 − λj] s
j
i. (5)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand in (5) is net labor income. The second and third
term denote the eﬀective return on savings. It is composed of domestic and taxed
savings, si
i, and savings that are invested in the foreign country, s
j
i, of which a





denote the production function in levels.







6fraction λj is taxed and a fraction [1 − λj] is not taxed. Inserting (4) and (5) into



















+ ˜ u(gi). (6)
Residents choose the level of si
i, s
j
i and li, taking as given the level of the publicly
provided good, in order to maximize utility. Let us assume that ei is suﬃciently large





i ≥ 0 and s
j
i ≥ 0. The ﬁrst–order conditions of the individual maximization problem
can be written as follows:
(s
i














The interpretation of the ﬁrst-order condition (7a) is that the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between second- and ﬁrst-period consumption, uc1/uc2, should be equal to
the net interest factor if a household decides to invest domestically. When, however,
savings are invested abroad then the household additionally takes into account the
undeclared part of capital income (7b). Condition (7c) states that the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure equals the net wage rate. A short
inspection of (7) reveals that the household is indiﬀerent between investing at home
or abroad if and only if tr
i = 0 or λj = 1. From this observation it follows directly
that consumers do not invest at home when tr
i > 0 and λj < 1. Let us assume
for convenience that this property holds as well for the case of indiﬀerence. These
observations lead to the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. For all tr
i ∈ [0,1] and λj ∈ [0,1], si
i = 0 and s
j
i is implicitly given by
λj [1 + ρi] + [1 − λj][1 + R] = uc1/uc2.
To pinpoint the problem of information exchange in international taxation Lemma 1
shows that consumers prefer to invest abroad in order to avoid taxation. Ensuring
that tax bases are highly intertwined between countries makes the problem of infor-
mation exchange most severe. The solution of the household optimization problem
gives rise to the savings function and to the labor supply function denoted as
s
j
i (ωi,ρi,R,λj) = e − ci1 (ωi,ρi,R,λj) and li (ωi,ρi,R,λj). (8)
7We may then insert (8) into the direct utility function to obtain the indirect utility
function ˜ v := v (ωi,ρi,R,λj) + ˜ u(gi).
Market equilibrium: Using the taxes introduced in (1) we can deﬁne a market
equilibrium for a given tax and information policy as a vector of {ωi,ρi,ri,λi,gi}
and {ωj,ρj,rj,λj,gj} such that ﬁrms maximize proﬁts, households maximize utility,
(i) labor markets clear,
l
d
i = li and l
d
j = lj, (9)

















= 0, ni + nj = 1, (10)

















= 0, ni + nj = 1. (11)
Denoting savings of a resident in country i by si = si
i + s
j
i we can rewrite capital
market–clearing (10) as
ni [ki − si] + nj [kj − sj] = ni mi + nj mj = 0, ni + nj = 1, (12)
where the diﬀerence between national investment and national savings in (12) is
measured by the capital–account balance, mi := ki −si. It follows from Walras’ law
that we can restrict attention to market–clearing conditions (i), (ii) and leave the
market–clearing condition for the consumption good (iii) implicitly satisﬁed.







the vector of policy instruments for both countries. At the beginning of period 1
the government in country i maximizes indirect utility ˜ v (x) subject to (2), (7), (9),































8using {xi} taking {xj} as given. Notice that we used (3) to substitute out for ki
in the last line of (13). A Nash equilibrium of this game is a vector of policies
xN = {xN
i ,xN






















































j lj + t
s
j kj.
It proves to be useful throughout the paper to analyze tax rates for a given level
of information exchange ﬁrst. Then we determine the optimal information policies
given these tax rates. We may now use ˜ v := v (xi) + ˜ u(gi) and (13) to obtain the
Lagrangean for the government in country i as






i (x) + λj s
j




i wir(ri)] li (x) − gi
i
, (14)
where µi denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the revenue constraint. An analogous
Lagrangean can be formed for country j. To derive the ﬁrst–order conditions re-
call viω = ζili and viρ = ζi si from Roy’s identity, where ζi := ∂vi/∂e captures the
marginal utility of private income. Then apply the tax deﬁnitions given in (1) and
use the slope of the factor–price frontier (3) to obtain
Ltw




























i = 0, (15a)
Lts






























i = 0, (15b)
Ltr











































iλj [siρ + siωwir]
i
Rλi − miζiRλi R 0, (15d)
Lgi = ˜ ugi − µi = 0, (15e)
where αi = [tw
i − ts
i wir] can be interpreted as the tax burden placed on labor in-
come. From condition (15e) follows that the government trades the marginal utility
of the publicly provided good with the value of the Lagrange multiplier, which mea-
sures the marginal resource costs of public funds. The equilibrium value of µi is
given by the solution of (15a)–(15c), which characterize government choice of taxes.
Condition (15d) characterizes the optimal degree of information exchange from the
9perspective of country i. Inspection of (15d) shows that information can be volun-
tarily exchanged if Lλi ≥ 0 at λi = 1, whereas information may not be exchanged
at all if Lλi ≤ 0 at λi = 0. As a ﬁrst observation we can decompose the ﬁrst-order
conditions (15) into tax-base and terms-of-trade eﬀects,
Lq = Lq|mi=0 + miζi γi(q)Rq, q ∈ {xi}, (16)
where γi(q) is a parameter depending on q, which is determined endogenously by the
solution of (15). From (16), the general ﬁrst–order conditions (15) can be decom-
posed into the ﬁrst–order conditions that hold in the case of a symmetric equilibrium
plus a capital–account balance eﬀect. Recalling that we allow countries to inﬂuence
equilibrium prices but assume that countries are identical except for diﬀerences in
population size clariﬁes that each country’s net capital exports are zero if govern-
ment use of taxes is eﬃcient. This property will be useful when we characterize
the eﬃciency properties of the Nash equilibrium and the incentives for information
exchange in the following sections. We will next derive the responses of the world
return to capital R resulting from changes in tax and information policies. For this
purpose rewrite the capital–market equilibrium condition (12) as
b(x) := ni mi (x) + [1 − ni]mj (x) ≡ 0, 0 ≤ ni ≤ 1. (17)




q ∈ {xi}. (18)
Diﬀerentiating (17) with respect to tw
i ,tr
i,ts
i and λi yields
btw
i = −ni [siω + liω wir], bts
i = −wir btw
i + ni li wirr,
btr
i = −ni [siρ + liρwir], bλi = [1 − ni][sjλi + ljλi wjr],
bR = bts
i − btr
i + [1 − ni][bts
j − btr
j]. (19)
It will prove helpful to employ compensated rather than Marshallian demand and
supply functions of the individuals. Denote compensated functions by a super-




iω, are always positive. Assuming that leisure and ﬁrst–period consumption are
Hicksian substitutes we ﬁnd that sc
iω and lc
iρ = −lc



















10Using these deﬁnitions and the factor–price frontier (3) we get the following Slutsky
decomposition:
liliρ − siliω = −li φi + mi l
c
iω, (20a)
lisiρ − sisiω = li ψi + mi s
c
iω. (20b)
3 The information problem
As a preliminary step we will ﬁrst characterize the tax structure chosen by gov-
ernments under the assumption that information is completely and voluntarily ex-
changed (Section 3.1). Using this tax structure, we then analyze the Nash equilibria
for endogenous information policies in a second step and we show that full infor-
mation exchange is in fact a Nash-equilibrium of the game (Section 3.2). However,
this equilibrium need not be unique and we will therefore move on to characterize
an equilibrium with no information exchange at all in Section 4.
3.1 Nationally and globally eﬃcient tax rates




maximize utility of consumers, taking the vector {ts
j,tr
j,tw
j } determined by the other
country and λj = 1 as given.
Lemma 2. The Nash equilibrium of large countries that diﬀer in population size
has the tax structure tr
iψi = tw
i φi and ts
i = 0 at λj = 1, i.e. compensated labor
and capital supply is reduced in the same proportion. This tax structure is globally
eﬃcient given the available taxes.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Only the residence-based tax on capital and the wage tax are used if information
is exchanged, tr
i > 0 and tw
i > 0 and the presence of both taxes eliminates any
tendency for governments in tax competition to distort the resource allocation. The
basic argument may be outlined as follows. With complete information exchange,
a government has the set of taxes available to eﬀectively control the consumption
decisions of residents. It then follows as an application of the Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971) production eﬃciency theorem to international taxation that governments
11choose not to use the speciﬁc tax on domestic capital investment, since this tax
creates a production distortion. The second-best equilibrium can be reached because
the tax bases of countries are not strategically linked when residence–based capital
taxation is sustainable and no constraints on wage taxation exist. The above result
has been emphasized in most previous work (Among the references would be Razin
and Sadka (1991) and Gordon and Bovenberg (1996)). However, it would be a
premature conjecture to conclude that we should not expect to observe a positive tax
on capital investment in an optimal taxation framework. By extending the identical-
country analysis of Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) to asymmetric countries it can
be shown that the source-based capital tax is used in the absence of the wage tax.
This result is even obtained in a small open economy where governments perceive
the elasticity of the source-based capital tax to be inﬁnitely elastic. Moreover,
the combined use of a source-based capital tax and a residence-based capital tax
eliminates any tendency of governments to under-provide public goods in capital
tax competition.6 We will discuss the implications of Lemma 2 and the Bucovetsky
and Wilson (1991, Section 4) result in the subsequent Section.
3.2 Information policies
Having characterized the tax structure we will now turn to the question whether
countries may voluntarily exchange information. Our discussion following (16) clar-
iﬁed that the total eﬀect of a change in the information policy on the Lagrangean
can be decomposed into the eﬀect of information exchange on the interest factor,
Rλi, and tax-base eﬀects. A short inspection shows that there are tax-base eﬀects
in (15d) which stem from price changes, an observation that will be crucial for the
determination of optimal information policies.
Proposition 1. With large countries diﬀering in population size there exists a Nash
equilibrium in which information is completely and voluntarily exchanged.
6A detailed derivation of these results is available from the authors.
12Proof. We use the Slutsky equation (20) to substitute out for siρ,liρ in the ﬁrst–order



























Assume the other country chooses λj = 1. Inserting the condition for government
choice of taxes (A.1b) from the Appendix in (21) shows that the terms in brackets
in condition (21) vanish. Since using (A.1b) in (21) leads to Lλi = 0 ∀ λi ∈ [0,1],
a reduction in λi is unproﬁtable for country i when the government sets taxes op-
timally. Full exchange of information, λi = 1, constitutes a Nash equilibrium as
required by the Proposition. 
Proposition 1 shows that voluntary information exchange is a Nash equilibrium.
In the following we will develop the intuition for this ﬁnding in more detail. (i) First,
it is not surprising that direct tax–base eﬀects are absent in (21), since the allocation
of real capital is independent of λi in the presence of an eﬃcient international capital
market which allocates savings to the country where the eﬀective return is highest.
(ii) Second, a decrease in λi leads to a change in the marginal conditions in the
other country j and tends to increase foreign savings, thereby reducing the world
interest rate to maintain zero proﬁts in production.
The fact that a country can reduce the interest rate via a more relaxed in-
formation policy seems to distort the incentive of the capital importer to provide
information to foreign tax authorities. This is the conventional ‘race to the bottom’
intuition that we mentioned in the beginning of the paper. However, the argument
cannot be complete since, (iii) third, the government will adjust the tax structure to
accommodate to the change in equilibrium prices according to condition (A.1b) in
the Appendix. Hence, the second eﬀect is exactly oﬀset by the third. This puzzling
observation is explained by observing from Lemma 2 that the government in coun-
try i, at λj = 1, is able to maintain the second-best optimal gap between marginal
rates of substitution and marginal rates of transformation in tax competition for
any information policy it may choose.
Withholding information by country i can have an eﬀect on the excess burden
of the tax system in this country only in two cases. First, if taxes are assumed to
13be exogenous, which is not the case in our model. Second, if competitive forces
between countries are relevant, which is also not the case, from Lemma 2, since the
nationally optimal tax structure is also globally optimal (from the viewpoint of the
whole world). We may then conclude that a change in, say, λi has no eﬀect on
welfare in country i, given the trading partner provides information, λj = 1. The
result in Proposition 1 is more general than the above analysis suggests.
It can be shown that the Proposition continues to hold when the wage tax is
absent. Then, governments will choose to employ the source-based capital tax and
the residence-based capital tax. Moreover, tax competition does not cause any
additional distortions in this scenario (see Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991, Section
4)). Hence, all the prerequisites described above are fulﬁlled and we may conclude
that full exchange of information is also a Nash equilibrium when the wage tax is not
available at the margin, say, because of political constraints.7 The case of restricted
wage taxation is interesting to list here since we observe both information exchange
and positive source–based capital taxes in equilibrium.
4 A co-operation or a co-ordination problem?
The above discussion suggests that under the standard assumptions made in the tax
competition literature information exchange is possible in order to enforce residence-
based taxation of ﬁnancial capital. Governments do not treat the provision of infor-
mation to other countries as a cost when a residence-based capital tax is in the set
of available tax instruments, even in the presence of size asymmetries. The problem
of information exchange thus has a diﬀerent structure compared to the standard
tax competition problem. If information exchange does not create a co–operation
problem, it may either generate no problem at all (if the equilibria of the last Section
are unique) or a co-ordination problem (if other equilibria exist). We will show in
this Section that the latter is the case.
4.1 Tax structures
As a ﬁrst observation note that no information transmission by the foreign govern-
ment (λj = 0) is equivalent to the non-availability of the residence-based tax for the
7A detailed derivation is available from the authors.
14domestic government (tr
i = 0). We can therefore derive optimal tax structures for
the case that at most the source-based tax on capital and the wage tax are avail-
able and then continue to show that (15d) is smaller or equal to zero at that point,
implying that the home country will have no incentive to provide information. Let
us ﬁrst derive the optimal tax structures in the absence of a residence-based capital
tax (i.e. for λj = 0).
Lemma 3. If source-based capital taxation, ts
i, and wage taxation, tw
i , are both
available, whereas residence-based capital taxes (tr
i = 0) are not, the tax structure in
the Nash equilibrium between countries that diﬀer in population size is characterized
by ts
iµi [niwir [miliω + φi] + li [bR − niliwirr]] = ni [mi ζi li + tw
i µi [mi liω + φi]]. The
Nash equilibrium in both taxes ts
i and tw
i is ineﬃcient.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4.2 Information exchange
By the equivalence of no information exchange and the non-availability of a residence
tax we can now answer the question whether λi = λj = 0 is in fact a Nash equi-
librium. First, use (17) and (20) to substitute out for siρ and lρ in condition (15d).
Use (19) to substitute out for Rλi. This allows us to write the condition for the
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To determine the incentives for a country to exchange information recall that the
Lagrange multiplier µi > 0 measures the marginal utility of the publicly provided
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s
i. (23)
Recall wjr < 0 and that ρj = R in the absence of residence-based capital taxation. It
is then clear that sjρ+ljρwjr ≥ 0 when the eﬀect of a change in the return to capital
on compensated factor supply functions outweighs the income eﬀects. Notice that
this assumption is much weaker than the assumption that factor supply functions
are not backward-bending. Using Lλi|λj=0 ≤ 0 we may state:
15Proposition 2. Assume that sjρ + ljρwjr ≥ 0. Then, λi = λj = 0 is a Nash
equilibrium of the tax competition game if ts
i ≥ 0.
In order to gain insight into the intuition for and implication of Proposition 2
consider the special case where the share of country j in the overall population
approaches one. We then obtain from (A.3) in the Appendix that the small country i
chooses not to tax capital when the residence-based tax is absent, whereas the large
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We have that ts
i < ts
j implying that per capita imports in the small country are mi > 0
from the optimal factor–pricing condition for capital in (2). However, mj approaches
zero and the tax bases of the capital taxes ts
j and tr
j coincide since sj approaches kj
in the large country j. For the small country i this implies that the utility level with
full exchange of information can always be obtained. However, for λj < 1, this is
not optimal for country i from (24), since mi is non-zero. By a revealed-preference
argument the welfare level of an inﬁnitesimal small country must then be higher
when country j does not provide information, λj = 0. Hence, there must be a
critical level of e ni where the small country has the same utility in the information
exchange and the no-information exchange equilibrium. In contrast it is clear that
the large country under-provides the public good and at the same time loses tax
revenue in the no–information exchange equilibrium. It is important to note that
the critical size e ni deﬁnes a borderline. For all ni ∈ [e ni,1 − e ni] the full-information
exchange and the no-information exchange equilibria can be ranked according to
the Pareto-criterion: both countries prefer to co-ordinate on the full information
exchange equilibrium. This result, however, is not obtained when ni < e ni. Then the
smaller country prefers the no-information exchange equilibrium, whereas the larger
country prefers the full-information exchange equilibrium. However, it is clear that
equilibria can be ranked according to the potential Pareto criterion since the only
systematic source of ineﬃciency in the model are diﬀerences in source-based capital
taxation. Hence, the sum of both countries utilities with λi = λj = 1 is larger than
the sum of utilities in cases where λi = λj = 0.
16What are the policy implications of the results of this paper? (i) First, the
equilibrium-selection problem between countries of similar size is relatively easy to
solve, since countries only have to co-ordinate their expectations on the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium. This ﬁnding rationalizes the empirical observation that
information–exchange treaties are frequently found between suﬃciently homoge-
neous countries.8
(ii) Second, the character of the equilibrium-selection problem diﬀers when coun-
tries are suﬃciently heterogeneous. Our model therefore provides an explanation for
the empirical observation that the agreement on information-exchange treaties is es-
pecially diﬃcult for countries that are very diﬀerent in size.9
(iii) Third, the model shows that the equilibrium-selection problem between
countries that diﬀer substantially in size has a diﬀerent character since the large
country wins from co-ordination on the full-information exchange equilibrium,
whereas a very small country loses. However, the full-information exchange equilib-
rium dominates the no–information exchange equilibrium according to the potential
Pareto criterion implying that a Pareto-improving transfer mechanism can be imple-
mented according to which the large country transfers resources to the small country
in order to compensate for the loss in utility due to the agreement on information
exchange. One explanation for the empirical persistence of the no-information ex-
change equilibrium can therefore be found in the lack of credible enforcement of such
a transfer mechanism which may be due to a lack of an agency with suﬃcient power
to enforce supra-lateral contracts.
8This is in line with the observation of Tanzi (1995, p. 85) that well-devised, cooperative mea-
sures of mutual tax assistance between tax administrators can be implemented by the resemblance
between the participating countries: ‘an early example of these broad agreements and one that
has inﬂuenced other attempts was the Nordic Mutual Assistance Treaty ...’ between Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. These countries can be considered to be suﬃciently homo-
geneous (see Sørensen (2000) and Richter (2001)) and support our result that the resulting policy
game has the structure of a co–ordination problem where equilibria can be Pareto ranked.
9An example of such a multilateral initiative is the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Adminis-
trative Assistance in Tax Matters of 1988, which came into force in 1995. This initiative, however,
has not been embraced by many countries.
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Our analysis has shown that asymmetric information about foreign investments does
not create a co-operation problem in the standard model of asymmetric tax compe-
tition that is accepted in the literature (Among the references are Bucovetsky (1991)
and Wilson (1991)). We argue that the results obtained in this model give a ratio-
nal explanation for the empirical observation that smaller countries (Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Canal Islands etc.) are reluctant to exchange information whereas
suﬃciently homogeneous countries may choose to exchange information. Volun-
tary exchange of information, which allows tax authorities to eﬀectively implement
residence-based taxation of portfolio capital, is a Nash equilibrium. The usual ‘race
to the bottom’ intuition does not hold in this model even though countries can in-
ﬂuence the international interest rate through a change of their information policy.
However, complete absence of information exchange can also be sustained as an
equilibrium of the game.
The structure of these results has a substantial inﬂuence on the implications
regarding the scope for residence-based taxation: if a residence-based capital tax
shall be implemented for a set of countries that diﬀer only with respect to size, the
under-provision of information stems from an equilibrium selection problem where
countries have co-ordinated on an ineﬃcient equilibrium.10 Such equilibria may be
long lasting because they are equilibria; national changes in the information policy
are not rational. In addition to this the no-information equilibrium is the natural
one for the countries of the European Union, for example, that started to integrate
their markets.
If the equilibria can be Pareto-ranked then the equilibrium selection problem
can be easily solved by countries because there exist strong incentives to coordi-
nate on bilateral information exchange. The examples of United States and the
Nordic Countries provide evidence that countries may indeed succeed in implement-
ing an exchange-of-information system without further centralization or agreements
on transfer payments. The mechanisms explored indicate that higher market in-
tegration, promoted by an economic and monetary union, is not a thread to ﬁscal
10As an application of the Folk theorem, an even stronger argument for co-ordination on the
equilibrium with information exchange would result in a repeated game under fairly weak condi-
tions.
18autonomy. Governments in rather homogeneous countries are able to overcome the
informational deﬁcits which constitute the basic reason for the ineﬃciency of decen-
tralized ﬁscal policy.
The equilibria cannot be Pareto-ranked if size diﬀerences are large. Then, the
full-information equilibrium and the no-information equilibrium can only be ranked
according to the potential Pareto criterion. Hence, the introduction of a supra-
national transfer mechanism is possible in principle which would guarantee the
unanimous support of an information exchange system. However, the credibility
of the enforcement of transfers becomes of primary importance for the unanimous
support of residence-based capital taxation with mutual assistance in information
exchange. The model suggests that the credibility of transfer payments is of crucial
importance in order to get the support of smaller countries, which may be reluc-
tant to exchange information since it obtains a higher welfare level in the Nash
equilibrium without information exchange compared to the globally eﬃcient equi-
librium (with information exchange). Although a Diamond and Mirrlees economy
is often considered as a benchmark case and has often been used in the previous
literature on optimal taxation, it is clarifying to brieﬂy discuss the robustness of
our main results when assumptions are relaxed. Keen and Wildasin (2000) show
that residence-based capital taxation is a measure to eliminate ﬁscal competition
in relevant scenarios, even when countries do not have the same per-capita budget
requirements. We would expect that our results carry over to these cases. The argu-
ment is that the combination of tax instruments which ensures that the nationally
optimal tax structure also is globally optimal also supports a Nash equilibrium with
information exchange in the present framework. Our analysis suggests, however,
that is may not be possible to implement this equilibrium when countries are highly
asymmetric, even in a setting where information policies have no direct eﬀects.
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Proof of Lemma 2





i using λj = 1 and mj = −ni/nj mi from capital market
clearing (12). Employing the Slutsky equation (20) to substitute out for siρ,liρ and
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Conditions (A.1) isolate those eﬀects of the source–based capital tax that cannot be
duplicated by the wage tax, (A.1a), or the residence–based capital tax, (A.1b). Since
wir < 0, wirr > 0, ψi > 0 and φi > 0 both conditions (A.1) can be simultaneously
fulﬁlled only if ts
i = 0. Hence, the government in an open economy (ni < 1) chooses
not to employ the source–based capital tax in the Nash equilibrium at λj = 1. Using
ts



















To prove the second part of the Lemma (the implications for eﬃciency) recall that
there exist no reasons for factor movements between countries that diﬀer in popu-
lation size if taxes are set eﬃciently. Then, tax policy replicates the benchmark of
a closed economy, ni = 1 and si = ki, where strategic incentives are absent. Ob-
serving that ts
i = 0 and that tr
i and tw
i as given by (A.2) are independent of country
size ni shows that government use of taxes is eﬃcient. As an implication tax policy
replicates the closed economy benchmark. Using mi = 0 in (A.2) proves that the
government in country i chooses taxes as tr
iψi = tw
i φi at λj = 1. This completes the
proof. 
20Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. If only the source-based capital tax and the wage tax are in the set of available
taxes (tr
i = 0), the tax structure in the constrained Nash equilibrium is determined




i = 0. We employ the Slutsky relationship (20) to substitute










i=0 = 0 ⇔
t
s
iµi [niwir [liωmi + ψi] + li [bR − liniwirr]] = ni [liζimi + t
w
i µi [liωmi + φi]].(A.3)
To prove the second part of the Lemma (the implications for eﬃciency) notice that
the tax structure in the Nash equilibrium given by (A.3) is a function of ni. Using
the Slutsky equation (20) and ni = 1, mi = 0 in the deﬁnition of bR [given in (19)]
shows that the tax structure (A.3) reduces to tw
i φi = ts
iψi in the benchmark of a
closed economy where strategic incentives are absent. 
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global and national efficiency even with a restricted set of taxes
We turn to the case where each government can use both, the residence–based tax
on savings as well as the source–based tax on capital, but not the wage tax. This
case was ﬁrst analyzed by Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991).
Lemma 4. Assume countries can use all tax instruments except for the wage tax.
The constrained Nash equilibrium of large countries that diﬀer in population size
has the following tax structure: tr
iψi = ts
i [wirr l2
i − wirφi] at (λi = λj = 1). The tax
structure in the Nash equilibrium is globally eﬃcient given the available taxes.
Proof. When both capital taxes but not the wage tax are in the set of available
taxes (tw
i = 0), the tax structure is determined by ﬁrst–order conditions (15b)
and (15c). We form Ltr
i − Lts
i using tw
i = 0 and λj = 1. Next, we employ the
Slutsky equation (20) to substitute out for siρ,liρ and the derivatives of R given
































Notice that this tax structure is not a function of ni. The same arguments as
in the proof of Lemma 2 show that government use of taxes is eﬃcient. Hence,




i − wirφi] at λj = 1.  Hence, if wage taxation is constrained at the margin
and ﬁscal authorities do not have a system of optimal commodity taxes available,
both taxes on capital will be used if information is fully exchanged, ts
i > 0 and
tr
i > 0 at λj = 1. Since the gross wage wi is negatively linked to changes in the gross
return to capital ri = R + ts
i through the slope of the factor–price frontier in (3),
the source-based tax on capital will be used as a substitute for the missing direct
tax on wage income to control the labor supply of residents. It is natural then to
analyze the case of an incomplete set of tax instruments, where labor taxation is
constrained:
1Proposition 3. With large countries that diﬀer with respect to population size and
the absence of wage taxation (tw
i = 0), there exists a Nash equilibrium in which in-
formation is completely and voluntarily exchanged, even in the presence of a positive
source-based capital tax (ts
i > 0).
Proof. We use the Slutsky equation (20) to substitute out for siρ,liρ in the ﬁrst-order































Using λj = 1 and inserting the tax structure given by condition (B.1) from Lemma 4
in condition (B.2) we have Lλi|tw
i =0 = 0∀λi ∈ [0,1]. A combined change in instru-
ments does not change this conclusion because a reduction of λi does not yield any
tax-base eﬀects that could be exploited by an increase in ts
i and the equilibrium price
vector is second-best eﬃcient. 
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